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BONNIE COLBY SALIBA,* DAVID B. BUSH,**
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Do Water Market Prices
Appropriately Measure Water
Values?
ABSTRACT
Valuation of changes in water availability is an important issue
in the western United States. Agriculture, industry, and expanding
urban centers are exerting increasing pressure on limited water
resources. Federal, state and local agencies are exploring and implementing a variety of water supply augmentation strategiesin the
western states, raising questions regarding the value of potential
increments or decrements in water supply. Pressuresfor water transfers exist as water in many regions is fully appropriatedand new
and expanding uses can be accommodated only through transfer
from establisheduses. In some areas, water is routinely transferred
through private market exchanges. In other areas, institutionswhich
govern water allocationslowly are being modified tofacilitatemarket
transfer of water rights. This research examines selected water markets in the western United States, observing water prices over time
and evaluating the appropriatenessof market prices as measures of
the economic value of incrementalchanges in regionalwater supply.
Market characteristicswhich may distort prices as indicators of
water values include imperfect competition, third party effects, uncertainty, and equity considerations. Western water markets exhibit
these characteristicsto varying degrees. Nonmarket valuation techniques are useful in supplementing price information generated by
market transactions.Reliance on both market and nonmarket value
information can help improve valuation of incremental increases in
water supplies and assist in betterpolicy decisions regardingsupply
augmentationproposals.

INTRODUCTION
Valuing incremental changes in water availability is an important task
in the western United States as agriculture, industry and population growth
exert increasing pressure on limited water resources. Federal, state and
local agencies have an active interest in regional supply augmentation
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strategies, including interbasin transfers and artificial recharge and recovery of imported water.' Seventy to eighty percent of water yield in
the West is the result of snowmelt generated from high elevation forest,
much of which is under public jurisdiction. Water yields can be significantly affected by timber harvest practices on these lands. 2 Management
strategies on lower elevation rangelands which alter vegetation and thus
evapotranspiration can also affect stream flow and groundwater recharge.3
Given the possibility of altered water availability, questions arise regarding the value of increments or decrements in regional water supply.
The objective of this research is to determine conditions under which
water market transactions generate prices that reflect the marginal social
value of water. The study identifies key market characteristics which
affect the appropriateness of price as a measure of value. Market characteristics and prices from five case study market regions are described
and contrasted in this paper. These markets illustrate the diverse hydrologic, institutional and economic conditions which govern water transfers
in the West. The paper concludes with observations on the role market
prices can play in valuing incremental changes in regional water supplies.
This article addresses water valuation using market prices. This is but
one facet of a broader question-how should the benefits and costs associated with supply augmentation projects be evaluated? Analysis of
market prices as possible measures of value contributes to understanding
how benefits might be estimated. However, other complexities involved
in evaluating watershed yield augmentation projects included the need to
consider opportunity costs and distribution of project costs and benefits,
along with evaluation of alternative means of accomplishing regional
water management objectives. 4 For instance, transfer of water from lowvalue to high-value uses can sometime substitute or complement supply
augmentation. This study finds that water markets typically deviate substantially from the competitive market model, and prices may serve as
only a rough approximation of the social value of additional water supplies. Market prices may not fully reflect changing conditions which affect
long term supply and demand for water resources. In most cases use of
market prices in project evaluations should be supplemented with other
1. Saliba, An Overview ofEconomic Considerations in Artificial Recharge Programs, ARTFICIAL
GROUNDWATER RECHARGE (1985).

2. Troendle, The Potential for Water Yield Augmentation from Forest Management in the Rocky
Mountain Region, 19 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 359-73 (1983).
3. Hibbert, Water Yield Improvement Potentials by Vegetation Management on Western Rangelands, 19 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 375-81 (1983).
4. Krutilla, Bowes& Sherman, Watershed Managementfor Joint Production of Water and Timber:
A Provisional Assessment, 19 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 403-14 (1983). See also Martin & Cory,
Discussion: Watershed Managementfor Joint Production of Water and Timber 20 WATER RESOURCES
BULL. 457-58 (1984) and Krutilla, Bowes & Sherman, Reply to Discussion, 20 WATER RESOURCES
BULL. 459-60 (1984).

Summer 1987]

WATER MARKET PRICES

measures of value, such as water's value marginal product in alternative
uses, or contingent valuation of water in recreational uses.
MARKET PRICES AS MEASURES OF VALUE-A
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A measure of value should fully reflect potential beneficiaries' willingness to pay for incremental increases in water supply, as well as any
positive or negative side effects (externalities) associated with the supply
increase. Prices in perfectly functioning competitive market will reveal
buyers' willingness to pay for the marginal (the last) unit purchased.
Figure 1 shows hypothetical urban, agricultural and aggregate demand
functions for water at a fixed point in time. The downward slope of the
curves reflects the typical economic assumption of diminishing marginal
utility. The value of the first units of water made available is high.
However, as more units of water become available to a particular water
user, that individual or firm is willing to pay less and less for each
additional increment of water. Different types of water users exhibit different levels of demand. Urban residents (illustrated by Du in Figure 1)
attach a higher marginal value to the first increments of water they use
than most farmers would be willing to pay for those same increments.
Irrigated agriculture also has a downward sloping demand curve for
water (shown as D, in Figure 1). The negative slope reflects the fact that
the first quantities of water available to a farm are the most valuable.
They are applied to crops which yield the highest net returns. Additional
water will be applied to the next most profitable set of crops, and so on.
The aggregate water demand curve, DA, is the horizontal summation of
the agricultural and urban demand schedules. Given a supply curve representated by S1, the market clearing price for water occurs at P t . The
market price is equal to or more than the unit value water users would
place on additional supplies if the supply curve shifted out to S2 . Willingness to pay for additional units of water could be substantially lower
than Pi, depending on the shape of the total demand curve to the right
of Q1. Data on current market transactions give little information about
the shape of the demand curve beyond Q,. As Figure 1 illustrates, even
where markets are perfectly competitive and generate no externalities,
observed prices serve only as an upper bound for what current market
participants might be willing to pay for additional supplies.
Figure 1 portrays water demand, supply, and price formation in a static
framework. As population and income levels grow or agricultural commodity prices and production technologies change, demand and supply
curves shift and new prices evolve. From a dynamic perspective, observed
prices emerging from existing demand and supply relationships could
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DU represents urban demand
D I represents irrigated
agricultural demand
DT represents total demand
and is the horizontal
summation of DI and DU
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FIGURE 1
Water Demand and Supply
In a static framework P, serves as an upper bound on the marginal value of additional
units of water made available by an expansion of supply from S. to S 2. Willingness to
pay for additional supplies depends on the shape of the aggregate demand curve to the
right of Q,.

either overestimate or underestimate the marginal value of water supply
increases in the future.'
Water transactions do not take place in well-functioning competitive
markets such as those shown in Figure 1. In general, water markets will
not generate prices that fully reflect the costs and benefits of water transactions to all parties affected. A distinction must be drawn between private
and social measures of value associated with water. A price negotiated
between a buyer and a seller of a water right reflects the values of the
units of water exchanged to each party and can serve as an indicator of

water value for the agents involved in the transaction.' A social measure
5. For a more complete discussion of water supply and demand in the Southwest, see M. KELsO,
W. MARTIN & L. MACK, WATER SUPPLIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AN ARID ENVIRONMENT 28-49

(1973).
6. In a smoothly functioning competitive water market, price is uniquely determined by convergence of buyers' and sellers' marginal values. In actuality, a negotiated price will lie between the
buyers' maximum willingness to pay for units of water exchanged and the minimum amount the
seller is willing to accept in payment for water transferred. In a transfer from a farmer to a city
water supply organization, for example, a farmer's lowest reserve price would be based on the value
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of value, however, also takes into account impacts on parties affected by
the transaction who were not part of the price negotiation process. This
could include neighboring well owners whose depth-to-lift is affected
adversely, local fishermem whose trout habitat is disrupted, future water
users whose access to water will be altered due to current market activities,
or local governments which experience declining tax base as water sales
shift resources out of the local economy. Four market characteristics which
may prevent market prices from representing social values are discussed
in this paper. These characteristics include imperfect competition, externalities, uncertainty and equity. Table 1 describes these characteristics
and provides examples of each characteristic in the case study markets.
If one or more water users, suppliers or government agencies can
significantly affect market prices and conditions for water transfers (imperfect competition), then observed prices may deviate from maximum
willingness to pay for marginal units of water. If water transfers positively
or negatively affect third parties and these effects (externalities) are not
taken into account in market transactions, prices will not reflect full social
values. Market prices give the upper bound of the value of an increment
in supply only to the extent that those prices represent all uses and users
of water affected by the transfer. Prices are unlikely to reflect instream
water uses (recreation, hydropower production, and provision of aquatic
habitat) unless these uses are represented in market transactions. 7 Lack
of information regarding future water availability and legal conditions
for water transfers can also distort market prices. Uncertainty reduces
willingness to pay when individuals cannot ascertain precisely what legal
rights and restrictions are associated with a water purchase. In addition,
distributional considerations may affect the appropriateness of observed
prices as measures of social values. Water transfers have an impact on
local economic activity both in the communities of origin and the communities receiving the water. Young, Mumme, and Ingram discuss the
impacts of water transfers on local economies.8 Market prices may arise
from a distribution of income and access to water which is considered
inequitable. If public agencies are working to improve the condition of
specific classes of water users, market prices as a measure of value may
be inconsistent with distributional objectives for the region. For instance,
of the marginal product of water in agriculture if a small proportion of his fights are sold. In addition,
farmers may view water rights as an appreciating asset and add speculative value into their reserve
price. See Gardner & Miller, PriceBehavior in the Water Market of NortheasternColorado,WATER
RESOURcEs BULL. 557-62 (1983).
7. Instream flows have been recognized as a beneficial use in Colorado and their value may
eventually be reflected in market prices as different organizations (including the Colorado Water
Conservation Board) acquire water rights to increase or maintain stream flows.
8. For discussions of the local economic impacts of water transfers, see Young, Direct and
Regional Impacts of Competition for IrrigationWater in the West, Presented at the Conference on
Impacts of Limited Water for Irrigated Agriculture in the Arid West (1982). See also Mumme, &
Ingram, Commodity Values in Southwest Water Management, 4 POL. STuD. REv. (1985).
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TABLE I
WATER MARKET CHARACTERISTICS, DEFINITIONS AND EXAMPLES
Descriptions

Examples from Case Study Areas

Imperfect
Competition
and Market
Restrictions

Market participants or public
agencies restrict price levels and
other conditions of market transfer,
and observed prices may reflect
these restrictions,

In northeastern Colorado, municipal
water departments and water districts
are under public pressure not to profit
from renting their unused water
supplies back to farmers. Most simply
rent excess water at cost rather than
attempting to charge market clearing
prices.

External
Effects of
Market
Activities

Market prices do not take into
account the values of parties
external to the price negotiation
process or impacts of transfers on
third-parties,

In the Lower Sevier River basin of
Utah, changing water use patterns by
the Intermountain Power Project has
improved water quality for irrigators by
reducing salinity in the river.

Uncertainty

Uncertainty regarding future water
supplies, demand, and the legal
framework that governs water
transfers will affect market
decisions and observed prices,

Significant quantities of additional
water supplies were denied to users in
Nevada when the federal government
decided to use Stampede Reservoir for
maintaining fish habitat in the Truckee
River instead of allocating the water for
consumptive purposes. The ensuing
scramble for alternative sources of
water has helped push water rights
prices to unprecedented levels.

Equity
and
Conflict
Resolution

Economic and legal barriers to
market participation can create
inequitable access to water. Water
allocation decisions may serve as a
form of conflict resolution and be
made on political rather than
economic grounds. Market prices
may not fully reflect distributional
and political considerations,

Many instream uses of water have
never been legally recognized and are
increasingly threatened by increased
consumptive uses offstream. In
southwestern New Mexico, unique
riparian habitat in Gila River is
endangered by a proposed dam.
Pyramid Lake Indians in Nevada have
no water rights to protect their
traditional fishing grounds, and have
turned to extensive litigation to
maintain minimum flows in the Truckee
River system.

Characteristics
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controversies regarding Native American water rights in the Southwest
illustrate the need to attend to equity issues.9
To summarize, there are several potential problems in considering water
market prices as measures of marginal social value. First, in a perfectly
competitive market observed price represents market participants' willingness to pay only for the marginal unit of water currently available.
Collective willingness to pay for additions to the existing water supply
could be substantially lower than the market price. Second, market activities may generate externalities so that effects of water use and transfer
are poorly reflected in market prices. Some externalities arise because
individuals affected by water transfers or supply increases are not market
participants and impacts on their well-being are not reflected in market
prices. Also, observed prices may -be influenced to varying degrees by
imperfect competition and legal or hydrologic uncertainties. Finally, market prices may reflect inequitable access to water and income-earning
opportunities.
WATER MARKET ACTIVITY
Each of five water market regions is briefly described with espect to
location, major water sources and uses, institutions that govern water
allocation and transfer, and available price data. Figure 2 identifies the
five market areas which are located in Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona
and New Mexico. The specific regions studied were selected based on
several criteria. Each area is characterized by economic scarcity of water,
well defined institutional and geographic boundaries, and availability of
public and private sources of information on water transfers and prices.
Lack of secondary sources containing detailed price information necessitated extensive fieldwork. Price data obtained from individuals familiar
with market transactions was a major source of information.
An effort has been made to make price observations as comparable as
possible over time and across market areas. Prices have been adjusted,
using the Gross National Product [GNP] price deflator, to 1986 dollar
values. In addition, several conventions have been adopted to allow the
comparison of different water rights in terms of common units of measure.
Water rights may be transferred in perpetuity (sold) or temporarily
(leased). Water values differ when water is sold or leased because rental
prices reflect annual or seasonal values only, whereas sales prices reflect
sums of discounted streams of values over extended periods of time.
9. Ingram, McGuire & Wallace, Poverty Power and Water Resources on the Papago Reservation,
Report to the Ford Foundation (1984).
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WATER MARKET STUDY AREAS
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FIGURE 2
1. NEVADA: Truckee River Basin, 2. UTAH: Lower Sevier River Basin, 3. COLORADO:

Northeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District. 4. ARIZONA: Phoenix and Tucson
Active Management Areas, 5. NEW MEXICO: Gila-San Francisco Basin

Unless otherwise noted, transactions described in this study are sales
rather than leases.
In quantifying water rights, it is important to distinguish between diversion rights and the consumptive use portion of a water right. Diversion
rights refer to the maximum quantity of water which may be withdrawn
per unit of time from a water source. Consumptive use refers to the
portion of that diversion right which may be removed permanently from
the hydrologic system through evaporation, transpiration, or other means.
The difference between diversion and consumptive use is the "return
flow," or the portion of the diverted water which returns to the system
and is available for appropriation and use by others. In many areas,
transfers of water are limited to quantities equal to the consumptive use
portion of the water right. This limitation is enforced in order to protect
otherwat
rsers from having their own water rights adversely impacted
as a result of the transfer. If water is transferred completely out of the
hydrologic system of origin, or if the rate of consumptive use differs
between the original use and the new use, the quantity of divertable water
that the seller of a right gives up in a transfer will usually not be the
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same as the quantity of water that the buyer is able to divert. Unless
otherwise indicated, all descriptions of transfers refer to the quantity of
water that may be diverted for use by the buyer.
Water rights are quantified by flow rate, by absolute volume, and
sometimes by both. Flow rates are usually measured in terms of cubic
feet per second, while volumetric limits are usually measured in terms
of acre feet per year. Water users are concerned not only with the rate
of flow or the volumetric limit of a water right, but also with the capacity
of the water resource to satisfy their rights. If the hydrologic capacity of
the water resource varies significantly over time, or if many other water
users have a senior claim to rights from the same water resource, then
the yield of a particular water right may not always be equal to the full
limit of the right. The long-term average yield of a water right often is
less than the maximum flow rate or volumetric limit of a water right.
Unless otherwise indicated, all water transfers in this study are quantified
according to their long term average yield, in acre feet per year.
Truckee Basin, Nevada
The Truckee River flows from Lake Tahoe in the Sierra Nevada Mountains into Pyramid Lake in the northwest Nevada desert. The Carson
River flows just south of the Truckee Basin. Water from the two river
systems is used conjunctively in the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District
[TCID], located downstream and about 50 miles to the east of the Truckee
Meadows. The cities of Reno and Sparks form the core of a rapidly
expanding regional population in the Truckee Meadows.
The majority of water used in the area is primary flow or storage from
the Truckee River. Rights to the Truckee River were adjudicated under
the Orr Ditch Decree of 1944. " Reno and Sparks receive water from
Sierra Pacific Power Company, a privately owned utility. The Washoe
County Government provides some water service to outlying communities. Irrigators are supplied with Truckee River water delivered by private
ditch companies. Lake Tahoe and Boca Reservoir serve as area-wide
regulatory and storage facilities for the Truckee River. In addition, Sierra
Pacific owns and operates one small reservoir and jointly owns and operates another reservoir with the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District.
Approximately fifteen to twenty percent of the water used in Reno and
Sparks is groundwater. While Sierra Pacific is considering increased
groundwater withdrawals in the future, current efforts focus on augmenting their Truckee River surface water rights. In addition to its existing
surface water rights, Sierra Pacific has a right to pump up to 12,000 acre
10. United States v. Orr Ditch Water Company, Equity Docket A-3, D Nevada, Final Decree
(1944).
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feet of groundwater per year. Recent withdrawals have varied between
8,000 and 10,000 acre feet per year. Another 2,000 to 3,000 acre feet
of groundwater are pumped by individual irrigators and private water
companies. In certain areas of the Truckee Basin, groundwater quality is
poor because it contains heavy metals. Groundwater overdraft is carefully
avoided in the Reno-Sparks area because of the danger of drawing poor
quality water into portable water supplies."
About 50,000 acre feet of Truckee River surface water rights are used
by Sierra Pacific to serve urban areas and 300,000 are used for irrigation
annually. Up to 300,000 acre feet per year of Truckee River water flows
into Pyramid Lake.' 2 The Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation and the TruckeeCarson Irrigation District are the major Truckee River water users located
outside the Reno-Sparks area. Indian, irrigators, and municipal users of
the Truckee River have been locked in continuing litigation over water
resources since the early twentieth century.' 3 Growth of the Reno-Sparks
area has brought increasing numbers of nonagricultural enterprises with
a high willingness-to-pay for water. Institutional barriers have precluded
the transfer of water rights from TCID to the Reno-Sparks area, forcing
these communities to support growth by reallocating water resources
locally.
A federal watermaster oversees the administration of the Truckee River
in compliance with the Orr Ditch Decree. In 1978, the State Engineer
closed the groundwater basin to further appropriation. Transfers of surface
water and groundwater rights are subject to approval by the State Engineer. Approval procedures seek to prevent impairmant of existing water
users' rights. The State Engineer consults with the federal watermaster
on transfers of surface water rights in the Truckee River under the directives of the 1935 Truckee River Agreement.
Until the late 1970s almost all transfers of surface water rights involved
the sale of irrigation rights to Sierra Pacific. By 1979, Sierra Pacific
became aware that it was not acquiring water rights fast enough to keep
up with the growing demand for its services. 4 Increasing awareness of
the scarcity of water has driven prices up more than twenty-fold since
1979 and has brought many new actors into the market. The Nevada
Public Service Commission, Sierra Pacific, the State and the local governments now require developers to provide water rights in exchange for
1I. Personal communication with Rick Moser, Engineer for Sierra Pacific Power Company, May
3, 1985 and Apr. 3, 1987.
12. Personal communication with Gary Stone, Federal Watermaster for the Carson and Truckee
Rivers, May 1,1985.
13. McNeeley, Economic and Institutional Aspects of Water Transfers in Northwest Nevada,
AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION BULL. B27 (1971).
14. Robert Firth, Policy statement regarding expansion of Sierra Pacific Power Company's water
service territory. Presented to the Nevada Public Service Commission (1979).
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new or expanded water service. 5 Developers acquire Truckee River water
rights from both within and around the periphery of the service area of
Sierra Pacific. These rights are dedicated to the cities of Reno and Sparks
as a precondition for development project approval. Rights acquired by
the local governments are leased for ninety-nine years to Sierra Pacific. 6
Sierra Pacific's long-term leases of water rights from the cities are based
on an assumed nominal market value of $1,500 per acre foot.
Prices paid for water rights by Sierra Pacific averaged about $100 per
acre foot between 1946 and 1959, rose to over $150 per acre foot between
1960 and 1964, fell to $140 per acre foot between 1965 and 1970, and
fell again to less than $75 per acre foot by 1979. Price offers by Sierra
Pacific rose to over $100 per acre foot in the early 1980s but higher offers
from other buyers, primarily real estate developers, left few individuals
willing to sell at that price. As late as 1983, Sierra Pacific was still
refusing to pay more that $200 for water rights while 7observed market
prices ranged from $850 to over $2,000 per acre foot.'

A potentially large pool of water rights available for transfer in the
Reno-Sparks area are the irrigation water rights appurtenant to lands that
have already been subdivided for urban development. Before the sharp
increase in the market value of water rights around 1980, and before
Reno and Sparks required the dedication of water rights as a pre-condition
for approval of any development, water rights usually were conveyed
along with land. Sierra Pacific routinely granted water service on subdivided parcels of these lands. Water rights remained with each parcel,
though they were no longer in use. Over 30,000 acre feet of unused
irrigation water rights are estimated to be distributed, most of them in
parcels of only a few acre feet, over thousands of acres of highway rights
of way, commercial establishments, and residential lots. 8
Since early 1985, the cities of Reno and Sparks have been soliciting
urban owners of these old irrigation rights to sell them. The price offered
is set by joint agreement of Reno and Sparks with Sierra Pacific at a
nominal value of $422 per acre foot. The low offer price is meant to
reflect the high transactions costs, primarily the title search, involved in
transferring small quantities of water rights appurtenant to lands which
have often been subdivided and which typically have changed hands
15. Nevada Public Service Commission, Docket 81-204 (198 1). See also City of Reno, Agenda
Report 85-70 (1985); City of Sparks Municipal Municipal Code, § 17.12.075; Washoe County,
Ordinance 586 (1985); State of Nevada, § 323 (1985).
16. Personal communication with Chris Cherches, City Manager for the City of Reno, Nevada,
Apr. 30,1985.
17. Supra note I1.
18. Firth & Moser, 1985-2005 Water Resource Plan, Sierra Pacific Power Company (1985). See
also supra note I I.
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several times. 9 As of the end of 1986, the program of acquiring unused
irrigation water rights in the Reno-Sparks urban area had met with only
limited success. Sparks had purchased about fifty acre feet of rights, and
Reno acquired about 325 acre feet. Apparently there are two reasons for
the lack of success. The first is that many holders of water rights resist
selling their rights in the belief that prices will rise significantly in the
future. The second is that several private water brokers operating in the
Truckee Meadows have been outbidding the cities. Typically the price
offered by the brokers range between $600 and $800 per acre foot, less
a brokering fee. The brokers assemble several small water rights into a
larger package for resale to a local developer. Prices for these brokered
packages of urban water rights have exceeded $2,000 per acre foot.2'
Sierra Pacific is considering various alternatives for acquiring additional
water rights from sources outside the Truckee Basin. These include purchase of surface water rights in Sierra Valley, California, and groundwater
rights in Warm Springs and Honey Lake, Nevada. Ranches in Sierra
Valley, California are irrigated by surface water rights from a number of
sources, including the Truckee River. Since Truckee River water rights
tend to be spread relatively thinly over many acres, the company would
have to purchase large parcels of land from dozens of different owners
to secure an adequate supply of surface water rights. The high cost of
the water rights (in excess of $2,000 per acre foot) along with local
opposition to the purchase and legal uncertainties associated with transporting water across the state line, have diminished interest in this particular alternative.'
Acquisition of distant groundwater rights appears to be a more promising alternative. In 1986, Sierra Pacific concluded an agreement with a
landowner in the Warm Spring Valley, located approximately twenty miles
northeast of the Truckee Meadows. Pending approval of the transfer by
the State Engineer and authorization of the purchase by the Public Service
Commission, Sierra Pacific will buy 2,100 acre feet of groundwater rights.
The company also retains an option to purchase up to an additional 700
acre feet of groundwater rights. The purchase price of $1,150 per acre
foot, which is considerably less than the current value of over $2,000
per acre foot for Truckee River rights, reflects the high cost of transporting
and treating the groundwater relative to local surface water supplies.
Funds for purchasing the rights have been placed in escrow pending
approval of the sale and transfer. In the meantime, the seller may collect
the interest accruing on the money.22
19. Personal communications with Sandy Landeck, Property Management Agent for the City of
Sparks, Nevada, Apr. 29, 1985 and May 22, 1986. See also supra note II.
20. Supra note 19.
21. Supra note 18.
22. Supra note 1I.
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A second possible source of distant groundwater is in the Honey Lake
Valley, located about thirty-five miles north of the Truckee Meadows.
Due to the high cost of developing this water supply, Sierra Pacific does
not expect to offer to pay more than $500 to $600 per acre foot. Proposed
transfers of groundwater out of Honey Lake Valley have been extremely
controversial, because the groundwater basin lies partly in Nevada and
partly in California. In early 1987, the State Engineer called a three-year
moratorium on all water transfers and appropriations of groundwater in
the Honey Lake Valley pending the results of a comprehensive study of
the Basin's hydrological capacity."
Lower Sevier Basin, Utah
The Sevier River flows north from the high plateaus of southwestern
Utah, terminating in the Sevier Desert one hundred and forty miles southwest of Salt Lake City. Four mutual stock irrigation companies-Delta,
Melville, Abraham and Deseret [the DMAD companies], control virtually
all surface flow rights on the lower stretch of the river. Each company
operates its own canal system within a designated service area but they
jointly own and manage several reservoirs. River salinity levels have
exceeded 3,000 parts per million but delivery costs are low and water
quality is usually adequate for irrigation.24 Until recently, water delivered
bhy DMAD was used exclusively for irrigation. In 1980, the Intermountain Power Project [IPPI bought twenty percent of DMAD company
stocks, thousands of acre feet of privately held groundwater rights, and
eighty percent of the water stock in another ditch company upstream of
DMAD. The total package of water rights, with a yield of 45,000 acre
feet per year, cost approximately $2400 per acre foot. The water will be
used for cooling a new coal-fired power plant which begins operations
in the late 1980s. The projected size of the power plant operation was
reduced after IPP had already purchased the water rights. Consequently,
about half the water rights owned by IPP are not needed for power plant
operations. IPP currently rents unused water to irrigators and plans to
continue this practice. 25
The Cox Decree of 1936 apportioned flow and storage rights along the
lower Sevier River.26 A river commissioner oversees water use and water
transfers to assure compliance with the decree. All appropriated water
rights in Utah are appurtenant to land and their transfer for use on other
23. Id.
24. Utah Department of Natural Resources and Energy, An Appraisal of the Quality of Surface
Water in the Sevier Lake Basin, Utah, 1964, Tech. Pub. No. 19 (1968).
25. Personal communication with Manuel Perez, Managing Engineer for the Intermountain Power
Project, Delta, Utah, May 7, 1985.
26. Richlands Irrigation Company v. West View Irrigation Company, Case No. 843, 5th District
Court of Utah. (1936).
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lands requires proceedings before the State Engineer. Water rights represented by water company mutual stocks, however, are appurtenant to
that company's entire service area and may be transferred freely for use
on different parcels within that service area.27 Seasonal water transfers
are permitted anywhere within the four companies' combined service
areas. They may be rented by anyone who will use the water within these
boundaries.2" Water rentals have occurred among members of the four
DMAD companies since the 1950s.
The DMAD companies, IPP, and individual water users own groundwater rights. Irrigation companies occasionally pump groundwater directly into the river in order to dilute saline surface water for irrigation
use. Transfers of groundwater rights from one location to another or from
one purpose to another, must go through proceedings established by the
State Engineer's office. Groundwater rights may only be transferred within
the same aquifer. This restriction applies both to aquifers in different
geographical locations and to deep versus shallow aquifers which overlie
one another. The lower Sevier River area is divided into low- and highimpact groundwater regions. Water rights may be transferred out of the
high-impact region (so that less water will be pumped there) but cannot
be tranferred into it.29 This provision is designed to preserve future groundwater supplies in the vicinity of Delta, where demand for groundwater
is expected to grow and concerns have been raised about groundwater
overdraft." °
The vast majority of water transfers are seasonal water rights rentals
among irrigators. Studies conducted between 1948 and 1964 indicate that
there has been no long-term upward or downward trend in the real price
of surface water.3' Short-term price fluctuations, documented since the
1940s, have followed the hydrologic cycle of the river. Rental prices are,
as expected, higher in dry years and lower in wet years. Over the last
several decades rental prices have varied between seven and seventy-five
dollars per acre foot. Sales of mutual water company stocks (nearly always
for irrigation) and groundwater rights purchases have generated prices
ranging from $300 to over $2,400 per acre foot since 1978. Prices rose
sharply in the period preceding and immediately after IPP's purchases in
1980, but leveled off to between $300 and $500 per accre foot in 1984
and 1985.
27. Anderson, The Efficient Use of Utah's Irrigation Water, UTAH L. REV. (1985).
28. Personal communication with Warren Tenney, Secretary-Manager for the DMAD Water Companies, Delta, Utah, May 6, 1985.
29. Personal Communication with Kirk Forbush, Assistant Area Engineer for the Utah Dept. of
Natural Resources and Energy, Division of Water Resources, Richfield, Utah, Aug I, 1985.
30. D. Hansen, Utah Dept. of Natural Resources Energy, Policy Statement on Underground Water
Appropriation in Delta Area, Millard County (1982).
31. Stewart, Operations ofthe Water Rental Market, Delta Area, Utah, Utah State Univ. (1965).
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Effects on water prices which might result from the entrance of IPP
into this market (both as a purchaser of water stocks and as a renter of
water rights to irrigators) have been masked by an unprecedented wet
cycle that began in 1983 and persisted through 1985. The rental market
-resumed in the middle of the 1986 irrigation season, but water was still
abundant and trading activity was light.
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, Colorado
The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District [NCWCD] lies
north of Denver and east of the Rocky Mountains. Urban centers include
Boulder, Fort Collins, Loveland, Longmont and Greeley. Irrigation is
extensive but has been declining in the face of urban growth.
Groundwater is generally of poor quality and is used primarily as a
supplemental irrigation water source. Surface water is preferred for municipal use. Surface water supplies originate as snowmelt and runoff from
the Rocky Mountains. Surface water quality is high, but natural seasonal
flows are erratic and highly variable. The majority of water supplied
comes from surface water delivered by different kinds of water service
organizations. The Colorado-Big Thompson [C-BT] project is the largest
single supplier in the area, delivering an average of 225,000 acre feet of
water annually from mountain reservoirs on the west slope of the continental divide to the NCWCD on the eastern slope. C-BT does not operate
local distribution systems. Instead a large and sophisticated array of diversion, storage, distribution, and treatment facilities are owned and operated by a variety of organizations-such as mutual water stock companies,
municipal water systems, water districts, and water user associations.
The substantial investment in infrastructure is a response to the abundant
but seasonal nature of the regional water resources.
Irrigated agriculture traditionally has been the major water use in the
area, but growing demand by industry, power generation, and rapidly
expanding cities characterizes a significant shift in water use. Urban
growth and land acquisition since the late 1950s have converted increasing
quantities of irrigation water rights to municipal uses. Cities obtain water
rights through purchase of water company stock, dedication of water
rights by developers in exchange for water service, and wholesale acquisition of water service organizations, especially irrigation companies
whose service areas became urbanized. Although the C-BT project orginally was developed as a supplementary water supply for irrigation,
approximately one-third of C-BT allotments now are in municipal or
industrial ownership.3 2
Primary surface water flows, storage rights, and groundwater that is
32. Hobbs, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, Memorandum (1986).
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"tributary," that is, hydrologically related to surface flows, are regulated
by the State Engineer on the basis of prior appropriation. Most groundwater rights in the NCWCD area are considered tributary to surface stream
flows. Most were filed after the rivers were fully appropriated and are,
therefore, junior to surface water appropriations. C-BT water is used to
offset fluctuations in natural surface water flows on the eastern slopes.
C-BT annual releases may range from 155,000 to 310,000 acre feet. In
dry years on the eastern slope the governing board of the NCWCD will
release more C-BT water, and less in wet years. 3
Water rights transfers in Colorado must be approved by a state water
court, but this procedure generally is unnecessary in the case of intracompany water stock transactions. Water rights represented by company
water stock are, therefore, very marketable rights. The larger the company
service area, the larger the area over which the water may be marketed
without court proceedings. The high value attached to C-BT water lies
in the fact that the project functions as a mutual stock water company,
with the largest service area of any such organization in Colorado. Water
rights controlled by the Colorado-Big Thompson project (represented by
shares, or "units," each one entitling the holder to 1/310,000 of the water
delivered by the project in a given year) may be used or transferred
anywhere within the NCWCD. The market price of a unit of C-BT water
serves as a benchmark against which all other water rights and water
rights prices in northeastern Colorado are evaluated.
Water service organizations derive their water supplies either from their
own adjudicated flow and storage rights, or from holding stock in other
water service organizations. The portfolio of water rights owned by the
city of Fort Collins, for example, includes shares of North Poudre Irrigation Company stock, units of C-BT, shares and interests in miscellaneous smaller water companies, as well as its own direct flow and storage
rights.
The marketability of water rights within the NCWCD is strongly affected by the ease with which the water can be physically transported to
the desired point of use at the desired time. The variation in the price of
water rights supplied by various organizations is related to the size of the
organization's service area and the flexibility of the water right in use
and transfer. The size of an organization's service area affects the spatial
flexibility of its water, and the extent of an organizations' storage facilities
affects the temporal flexibility of its water deliveries. Both spatial and
temporal flexibility are important determinants of water values. C-BT
units and North Poudre Irrigation Company shares, because of their flexibility and easy transferability, are the most marketable kinds of water
33. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, Rules and Regulations (1956).
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rights in the NCWCD. On a per acre foot basis, C-BT water tends to
sell at a slightly higher price than North Poudre water. Other less flexible
sources of water are of correspondingly lower value.34
Deliveries of C-BT water started in the late 1950s. In 1961, C-BT units
sold for about $97 each. Assuming a long-term average yield on C-BT
units of about 0.75 acre feet per unit, that price was equal to about $130
per acre foot. Prices per acre foot rose to $440 in 1965, $920 in 1970,
$1,090 in 1975, $2,540 in 1977, $3,050 in 1979, and peaked at about
$3,600 in 1980. Since 1980, the real price of C-BT water has fallen, and
by 1986 it stood at about $1,000 per acre foot.
The water market in northeastern Colorado includes an active rental
market for C-BT units, ditch company shares, and individual flow and
reservoir rights. Municipal water service organizations hold enough water
rights to avoid cutbacks in service during dry periods. As a result, in a
typical year annual water supply available for municipal use is in excess
of demand. Excess municipal water is rented to irrigators. Information
on rental prices is difficult to obtain because, unlike sales, rentals are not
carefully recorded. However, available evidence indicates that water rental
prices in the NCWCD have remained low relative to the market value of
most water rights. This is due to the relative abundance of rental water
in most years, the fact that most water is rented to agricultural users who
are unwilling to pay high prices, and to public pressure against earning
"excessive" profits from rentals.
Southern Arizona
In Arizona, several distinct types of water rights have been purchased
by users in the Tucson and Phoenix Active Management Areas [AMA's].3"
These include irrigation rights that can be converted to Type I nonirrigation groundwater rights, Type II nonirrigation groundwater rights,
groundwater rights originating outside of the AMA's, surface water flows,
and reclaimed sewage effluent.
No irrigation rights, whether they are groundwater or surface water
rights and whether they are located inside or outside an AMA, can be
purchased without simultaneous purchase of the land to which they are
appurtenant.3 6 Purchasers of irrigated farmland located within an AMA
may convert the groundwater rights on the land to "Type I" nonirrigation
groundwater rights. Type I rights are limited to a maximum rate of with34. H. Menzel, Northern Colorado Irrigation Rights (1979).
35. Active Management Areas IAMAs] were created under the 1980 Groundwater Management
Act. AMAs are designated management areas for controlling groundwater overdraft, augmenting
water supplies, and encouraging more efficient use of existing water supplies (ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§45-411 (1986 Supp.)).
36. Id. at AREZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§45-141, §§45-453, §§45-463, and §§45-465.
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drawal of three acre feet per irrigated acre per year, or the quantity which
had been permitted for irrigation, whichever is less.37 There are no specific
quantity limitations on groundwater rights acquired outside an AMA.
Buyers who wish to export groundwater from lands located outside of
AMA's are limited
only to those quantities of water they can put to
38
"beneficial use."
Within the Tucson AMA, the market for Type I rights is dominated by
the city of Tucson. Tucson has been purchasing and retiring irrigated
farmland in the neighboring Avra Valley since the early 1970s. Assuming
that the land has no value apart from the water rights, and assuming an
exportable yield of three acre feet of groundwater per irrigated acre, prices
for Avra Valley water have increased from a range of $400 to $500 per
acre foot in the early and mid-1970s to a range of $650 to $1,000 per
acre foot in the 1980s. By the end of 1986 over 20,000 acres of irrigated
and nonirrigated land had been acquired, with a total exportable yield of
approximately 55,000 acre feet. 9
There are several factors which complicate the evaluation of water
rights prices in the Avra Valley. Prices emerge from transactions occurring
between a single buyer, the City of Tucson, and a limited number of
potential sellers, the Avra Valley farmers. The cost of each acquisition
included irrigated land, nonirrigated land, and all improvements, and it
is, therefore, difficult to assign a value to the water rights alone. Future
water values in the Tucson area will be affected by the Tohono O'Odham
[Papagol Tribe's water rights. The 1982 Southern Arizona Water Rights
Settlement Act gave the Tribe rights to 76,000 acre feet of water annually,
to be delivered by 1992. Some of this water will come from the Central
Arizona Project, some may be treated effluent, from the City of Tucson
(to be used in water exchanges, since it cannot be transported to the
reservation through existing facilities or the CAP canal), and another
portion will come from new groundwater withdrawals. The Act allows
for leasing of tribal water rights to water users within the Tucson Active
Management Area under specific conditions and with the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior.' The potential availability of significant quantities of leased water in the Tucson area creates a great deal of uncertainty
regarding future water transfers and prices. Given all these considerations,
observed prices for retired irrigation rights and agricultural properties do
not appear promising as measures of future water values in the Tucson
area.
37. AIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. Id. at §§45-469.
38. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. Id. at §§45-453.
39. Personal communication with George Parker, Property Management Agent for the City of
Tucson, Ariz., Nov 22, 1985. See also Tucson Water, Master Plan and Ten-Year Capital Improvement
Program, 1987-1979 (1986).
40. Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-293 (1982).
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Numerous purchases of farmland in the Pinal and Phoenix AMA's for
Type I conversion have occurred. In 1985 the city of Mesa, located in
the Phoenix AMA, purchased over 11,000 acres of irrigated farmland,
located in the Pinal AMA, with a yield of about 30,000 acre feet in Type I
nonirrigation water rights. Average prices paid per acre foot were about
$1,000 per acre foot. Mesa's purchase has given rise to numerous concerns in Pinal County about the local economic impact of the farmland
sales. Of primary concern are the effects of farmland retirement on the
local and county tax base, secondary impacts of reduced farming activity
on other local businesses, and the loss of water rights for future economic
development. Mesa is working to overcome the negative impacts of farmland, retirement, and water transfer in two ways. The city has committed
itself to making voluntary cash contributions to Pinal County and to local
irrigation districts in lieu of property taxes, which the city is legally
exempted from paying. Mesa is also planning eventually to convert the
agricultural CAP allocation on the farmlands it owns to nonagricultural
allocations, and to leave this allocation of one acre foot of water per acre
on the rural land for use in future nonagricultural development. 4
In 1985, a Phoenix-area investment group purchased a farm in the
Phoenix AMA with 2,240 irrigated acres. The irrigation water rights are
convertible to Type I nonirrigation rights with a yield of 6,180 acre feet
per year. The purchase price averaged slightly under $1,300 per acre foot.
In 1986, the same investment group purchased another farm in the Phoenix
AMA with 6,070 irrigated acres and a yield of 15,340 acre feet in Type
I nonirrigation rights, for approximately $1,000 per acre foot.
Type II rights are held by golf courses, mines, hospitals, dairies, sand
and gravel operations, power plants, and other municipal businesses which
obtain supplies of groundwater independently of municipal water service
organizations. In contrast to other water rights in Arizona, Type II nonirrigation groundwater rights are not strictly appurtenant to land. They
are easily transferable to other locations within the same AMA. 42
Although the absence of appurtenancy rules would appear to make
Type II rights more marketable than other water rights in Arizona, the
supply and demand for the rights is limited and the volume of Type II
water rights transacted is small. The supply of Type II rights is limited
because they constitute only a small proportion of the total water rights
in Arizona's Active Management Areas. Another limitation on the supply
of Type II rights is related to certain restrictions on their transferability.
Type II rights designated for mining and power generation purposes may
not be transferred to any other use. Transfers of Type II rights are restricted
41. Personal communication with Karl Kohlhoff, Water Resources Management for the city of
Mesa, Ariz., Dec. 9, 1985 & Jan. 7, 1987.
42. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§45-471 (1986 Supp.).
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to the whole quantity of the right, that is, they may not be fractured and
sold piecemeal."'
The demand for Type 1I rights is limited because they are of interest
to only a relatively small number of water users in Arizona. Generally,
they are not attractive to municipal water purveyors, who have little
incentive to purchase local water rights. Existing municipal water providers with AMA's hold "service area" water rights, which allow them
to pump as much groundwater within their service areas as they need to
serve their customers. Water providers in AMA's who have purchased
water rights have done so because their local wellfields and surface water
supplies were approaching or were already at full capacity, not because
they are legally restrained from additional local groundwater pumping.
Demand for Type II water rights is, therefore, limited mostly to independently supplied nonagricultural water users and to new water service
organizations with no established service area water rights. Typical prices
in the Tucson and Phoenix AMA's between 1984 and 1987 have ranged
from $500 to $1,500 per acre foot.
Several other purchases of groundwater and surface water rights have
taken place in Arizona outside of the Active Management Areas, mostly
in La Paz County in west central Arizona. In 1984 the city of Scottsdale
purchased the 8,400 acre Planet Ranch, with an estimated yield of 13,500
acre feet of surface water rights, for about $900 per acre foot. The city
hopes to transport water from out of the Bill Williams River to the CAP
aqueduct, which would then carry the water to Scottsdale.' The CrowderWeiser Ranch, consisting of 6,100 acres of state leased land and 3,920
acres of private land, was purchased by a real estate development company
in 1985 to support projects in the Phoenix Area. A series of small acquisitions by the same developer totalling an additional 3,700 acres of
private land continued through 1986. The total yield of transportable
water rights from the Crowder-Weiser Ranch is estimated to be 51,140
acre feet of groundwater per year. The first lands with water rights were
purchased at an an average price of over $950 per acre foot. Subsequent
purchases cost slightly over $500 per acre foot.
In December, 1986, the city of Phoenix concluded negotiations for the
purchase of 16,000 acres (2,000 acres of state land leases and 14,000
acres of private land) in the McMullen Valley of eastern La Paz County,
for slightly over $30 million. The city estimates that between six and
seven million acre feet of recoverable groundwater are in storage in the
aquifer underlying the lands. Approximately 30,000 acre feet of water
43. Id. at §§45-474.
44. Personal communication with Leonard Dueker, Executive Assistant to the City Manager,
Scottsdale, Ariz., Dec. 9. 1985 & Feb. 10, 1987.
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per year will be transported to the city by the year 2005.' Since the
McMullen Valley lies outside the Active Management Area system, legally Phoenix is free to pump as much water as it wants, so long as the
water is being put to "beneficial use." However, groundwater exporters
can be held liable to pay damages to third parties who demonstrate that
the export of the water is causing them harm.'
Another emerging water market in Arizona is the leasing of sewage
effluent. Pima County, in the Tucson AMA, has been selling up to 3,500
acre feet per year of treated effluent to farmers in the Cortaro-Marana
Irrigation District for several years at nominal price of $5 per acre foot.
In 1987, the price will rise to at least $10 per acre foot. Tucson city
policy encourages all large commercial water users to use effluent whenever possible. New golf courses in the Tucson service area are now
required to irrigate their turf with effluent.47 In 1986, Tucson provided
effluent to commercial water users for $372 per acre foot.
An agreement for the sale of large quantities of effluent was signed in
1973 between Palo Verde nuclear power station, located west of Phoenix,
and several Phoenix-area cities. The contract includes four separate purchase options, which, if exercised, would provide as much as 140,000
acre feet of effluent annually to Palo Verde through the year 2040. The
cost for the effluent was fixed at $30 per acre foot, a sum now considered
inadequate. A series of lawsuits challenging the validity of the contract
may ultimately reopen negotiations and allow the cities to establish a
higher price for the effluent.48
Gila-San FranciscoBasin, New Mexico
The Gila and San Francisco Rivers drain the southwesten comer of
New Mexico. The Gila-San Francisco Basin is sparsely populated, but
Silver City, a town of about 20,000 people, is located nearby. The GilaSan Francsico Basin effectively has been closed to additional groundwater
appropriations since the late 1960s. New groundwater wells may still be
developed, however, by converting a surface water right to a groundwater
right and changing the point of diversion to the desired well location.49
45. Personal communication with Carrol Reynolds. Planning Engineer for the city of Phoenix,
Arizona Water Department, Dec. 22, 1986. See also James M. Montgomery, Consulting Engineers,
Inc., City of Phoenix Water Resources Study, McMullen Valley (1986).
46. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN, §§45-544 & §§45-545. (1986 Supp.). See also supra note 45.
47. Personal communication with Kirk Guild, Planning Division for the City of Tucson, Arizona,
Jan. 9, 1986. See also Tucson Water, Generalized Effluent Reuse Policies (1982). See also City of
Tucson Ordinance No. 6411; Tucson Water: Schedule of Rates and Charges (1986).
48. A. Tumbling T. Ranches v. City of Phoenix, et. al., Superior Court of the State of Arizona
in and for the County of Maricopa (1983). See also Nuke Plant Will Pay Market Price, I U.S.
WATER NEWS 12 (1985).
49. Harris, New Mexico Water Rights, N.M. Water Resources Res. Inst. Misc. Rep. No. 15
(1984).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol, 27

Since the 1960s, as changes in land use have created demands for water
distant from old irrigation ditches, many surface water rights have been
retired and exchanged for groundwater rights. In addition, the State Engineer still routinely issues permits for limited indoor household use of
groundwater.5" These permits are not considered appropriated rights.
Rights to the Gila and San Francisco river systems were adjudicataed
in the early and mid-1960s as a result of the settlement of the Colorado
Basin lawsuit, Arizona v. California.5 Approximately 30,000 acre feet
of Gila and San Francisco River water may be used in New Mexico's
Gila-San Francisco Basin. Surface water on the Gila, the San Francisco,
and tributary streams usually is delivered by ditch companies and is used
almost exclusively for irrigation. The major exception is a large block of
surface flow rights used for mining operations by the Phelps Dodge
Corporation. Towns and residential subdivisions depend entirely upon
groundwater. Most other rural domestic and industrial users depend on
their own private groundwater supplies. There are no significant surface
water capture and delivery systems other than those serving Silver City
and the Phelps Dodge mine. Ditch companies generally serve only a few
neighboring farms. Storage facilities on the Gila-San Francisco system
are limited to small reservoirs, mostly privately owned.
Until the mid-1960s, agriculture was the major user of water in the
Gila-San Francisco Basin. The pattern of water use changed substantially
in 1968, when Phelps Dodge acquired land and approximately two thirds
of all the water rights appurtenant to lands in the Gila portion of the
basin.52 Other nonagricultural commercial and household water users have
since entered the market to acquire water rights.
The largest water rights holders in the basin are the Phelps Dodge
copper mine, which uses about 11,000 acre feet per year, and Silver City.
Silver City is not located in the basin itself, but transports approximately
800 acre feet of water annually across the continental divide from wellfields in the Gila-San Francisco. Other water users include a few smaller
mining operations, some irrigation, and a scattering of small rural communities, private homesteads, and small subdivisions.
In 1986, Phelps Dodge announced that it had purchased Kennecott's
interest in the Chino mine in the Mimbres basin, and that it planned to
phase out its mining operations at its Tyrone mine in the Gila-San Fran50. Personal communication with David Alison, Office of the State Engineer, District 3, Deming,
N.Mex., Mar 8, 1985.
51. State of Arizona v. State of California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
52. The Pacific Western Land and Cattle Company (a subsidiary of the Phelps Dodge Corporation)
purchased large tracts of land during the 1950s and 1960s in what later became the Gila-San Francisco
Basin. The company developed extensive water rights for irrigation prior to the State Engineer's
declaration and closing of the basin in the mid to late 1960s. Phelps Dodge transferred most of the
irrigation water rights to its mine in 1968.
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cisco Basin. 3 Approximately half of the over 11,000 acre feet of water
rights owned by Phelps Dodge in the Gila-San Francisco will no longer
be used for mining within ten years, and within twenty years the mine
will be shut down completely, freeing up all of the water rights for
alternative uses. The mine has considered transferring some of its rights
to domestic purposes on company land that may be sold for retirement
homes, but it is unlikely that all or even most of Phelps Dodge's water
rights could be used for that purpose. The future of the supply and demand
for water rights over the next few decades in the Gila-San Francisco Basin
is, therefore, highly uncertain.'
Water rights in the state of New Mexico are under the jurisdiction of
the State Engineer. Any change in the point of diversion, purpose of use
or place of use of a water right must be approved by the State Engineer.55
As a federally adjudicated area, the Gila-San Francisco faces stringent
controls. Appropriation of new water rights for outside domestic use,
something routinely granted elsewhere in the state, is not permitted.
Households with independent water systems cannot maintain lawns, gardens, orchards, or fishponds unless existing water rights are acquired
from another user. The Gila-San Francisco Basin, therefore, has an active
market for domestic water rights.56 Domestic, municipal, and industrial
water rights are most commonly acquired through the purchase and retirement of irrigation rights.
Water rights in the Gila-San Francisco Basin are appurtenant to specific
parcels of land, but they may be owned and transferred separately from
the land. Rights may not be transferred into or out of the particular subbasin (the Gila and the San Francisco) where they were established.
However, quantities of water equal to the consumptive use of any water
right (except a domestic water right) may be transported to any location
inside or outside the Gila-San Francisco Basin, subject to the approval
of the State Engineer.
Water rights purchases by area mines have constituted the largest volumes of water transferred over the past fifteen years (but represent only
a small number of transactions). Prices from these transactions are difficult
to document, because mining companies are generally unwilling to disclose information on their purchases and sales. Some data on private sales
to the mines were made available from area realtors and other individuals.
Most transactions recorded by realtors took place within the past ten years
53. Personal communication with Joe Smith, Bureau of Reclamation, Division of Advanced
Planning, Phoenix, Ariz., Sept. 25, 1986.
54. Supra note 53.
55. N.M.S.A. §72-5-24 (1978).
56. Personal communication with Hilton Dickson, Attorney for Silver City, New Mexico, Apr.
11, 1985.
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and involved small quantities of water rights, frequently equal to an acre
foot of water or less.
The typical price for an acre foot for water rights ranged between

$1,500 and $1,800 in the early 1970s. Prices remained fairly constant
until the late 1970s, when they rose to a range of $2,000 to $3,200 per
acre foot. Prices have declined since the early 1980s to a range of $1,100

to $1,800 per acre foot.
COMPARISON OF PRICES ACROSS MARKET AREAS
Price data for sales of perpetual water rights compiled as a part of this
study are summarized in Table 2. Water rights prices are a function of
the interaction between demand and supply-side forces in any given market area. Demand side forces reflect expansion and contraction of water-

using activities, which in turn depend on the vitality of the regional
TABLE 2
REPRESENTATIVE PRICES FOR SALES OF PERPETUAL WATER RIGHTS,
IN 1986 DOLLARS PER ACRE FOOT
Coloradob Nevada'

Arizona*
Year

Avra
Valley

Type
11

New Mexicod

C-BT

Truckee
River

Gila

130
150
220
370
440
530
560
600
850
920
860
860
930
1,050
1,090
1,330
2,540
2,590
3,050
3,600
2,990
1,880
1,600

150
140
170
150
130
160
160
150
140
140
130
120
120
110
100
90
90
80
70
ND
ND
470
1,730

1,790
ND
1,300
ND
ND
1,630
ND
ND
1,240
ND
1,150
1,420
3,210
2,070
3,270
2,090
1,780
1,460

Utah'

San
Francisco

DMAD

Groundwater

510
480
440
ND
1,110
510 f
ND

330
ND
300
550
550
ND
2,440
1,200
750
430

2,440
1,150
680
ND
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Colorado" Nevada'

Arizona'
Year

Avra
Valley

Type
II

1984
1985
1986
1987

870
NT
630
NT

560
920
1,430
1,000

New Mexico4

C-BT

Truckee
River

Gila

1,460
1,080
ND
ND

1,570
1,450
ND
1.750

2,520
ND
ND
1,810

San
Francisco
1,460
1,250
1,210
1,110

Utah'
DMAD

Groundwater

430
350
ND
ND

740
710

NT indicates no transactions occurred in this market during the year indicated.
ND indicates no price data were obtainable for transactions occurring during the year indicated.
'Data on the sale of Type II nonirrigation water rights were obtained from investment managers,
real estate developers, attorneys and other private individuals. The market for Type II rights began
to develop in 1984. Data on the city of Tucson's acquisition of Avra Valley farmland for conversion
of irrigation water rights were provided by city officials. Tucson began buying Avra Valley farmland
in 1971.
bData on sales of C-BT units were obtained from public water districts, municipal water agencies,
and real estate brokers in the area.
'Summary information on water rights acquisitions and prices between 1945 and 1979 were obtained
from records provided by Sierra Pacific Power Company. Data on purchases occurring since 1979
were obtained from reports filed by Sierra Pacific with the Nevada Public Service Commission and
from attorneys, engineers and private individuals. Price data for transactions prior to 1979 are based
on Sierra Pacific acquisitions. Other buyers did not enter this market until the 1980s.
"Descriptive data on water rights transfers, excluding price information, were available from records
in the State Engineer's office. Price data on a portion of these transfers were collected by contacting
individuals involved in the transactions. Records of water rights purchases by Silver City and by
the state of New Mexico are public information.
'Data on transfers of groundwater rights and ditch company water stock were collected from real
estate brokers, attorneys, bankers and other private individuals in the study area. The quantity and
price of the water rights purchased by the Intermountain Power Project are public information.
"The weighted average observed price paid for water fights in the San Francisco sub-basin in 1982
was distorted by one relatively large transaction in which the price was approximately $350 per
acre foot. In other, smaller transactions occurring in the same year, prices ranged as high as $3,265
per acre foot.

economy, price levels for energy, minerals and agricultural commodities,
population and income trends and other factors. Supply-side forces reflect
changes in water availability and in the costs of pumping groundwater,
developing new surface water supplies, contracting for public project
water and pursuing other alternatives to market acquisition of water rights.
Differing demand side forces were dominant in the study areas over
various periods of time-energy development in the Lower Sevier Basin
in the late 1970s, rapid urbanization in Central Arizona and Eastern
Colorado during the 1960s and 1970s, mining expansion in the Gila-San
Francisco Basin during the 1960s and 1970s. On the supply-side, Arizona,
Colorado and Utah water prices are affected by expectations of new water
supplies from the Central Arizona Project, the Windy Gap Project, and
the Central Utah Project, respectively. Anticipation of new water supplies
can decrease incentives to bid water away from existing rights holders.
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Prices tend to be lower when the predominant buyer for the water rights
is irrigated agriculture, as with DMAD stock in Utah until the IPP purchase, and nonagricultural water users do not compete significantly for
water with irrigators. Prices tend to be higher where expanding nonirrigation water users face institutional barriers and/or physical supply limits
in seeking additional water supplies. In the Gila-San Francisco Basin of
New Mexico and the Truckee Meadows in Nevada, for instance, water
supplies are constrained by legal and hydrologic constraints on water
supply development and water users have few alternatives to market
acquisition when they desire additional water.
The interaction of shifting supply and demand for water along with
the variety of institutional arrangements among the study areas cause
many different types of price responses to be observed. In southern Arizona, where declining groundwater tables and high energy prices are
perceived as making water resources scarcer than in many other areas
studied, water rights prices still remain relatively low. Institutional uncertainties involved in transferring water rights and the existence of alternatives to water rights transfers (the primary alternative being water
service from the Central Arizona Project) reduce incentives for market
transfers.
Northeastern Colorado provides an example of how perceptions of
water scarcity may rapidly increase water rights prices even though longterm supplies remain relatively inexpensive and abundant. A speculative
boom in the mid-I 970s drove real prices for water rights to unprecedented
levels by the early 1980s, although the gradual transfer of water rights
from agricultural to nonagricultural use continued without any major
change. Widespread concern that increasing urban water demand was
quickly outstripping supply led to sharp increases in prices. Gardner and
Miller"7 suggest that prices peaked at values equal to the capitalized
marginal demand for water by municipal users. As urban growth accelerated, agricultural right holders believed that they each had a high probability of being able to transfer their water rights to municipal or industrial
water users and were no longer willing to sell at prices that reflected only
water's value in irrigation. For a brief period of time the value of the
water in urban uses was fully capitalized into market prices.
Shifts in demand for water rights, or the expectation of upward shifts
in demand for water, have led to rapid water rights price changes in other
market areas as well. The impact of a large new water buyer can be
observed in Utah water prices as the Intermountain Power Project entered
the Utah market in the late-1970s. Prices in Gila-San Francisco Basin,
which had been slowly rising for a number of years, took a sudden turn
57. Supra note 6.
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upwards in the late-1970s when the Exxon Corporation began to acquire
water rights for its new mining operation.
It is instructive to consider not only what forces drive water rights
prices up, but also what forces allow them to fall. Water rights prices in
northeastern Colorado fell in the 1980s at least partially in response to
the impending completion of the Windy Gap Project, declining interest
rates, and a faltering farm economy. In addition, some observers believe
that cities began to recognize they had acquired adequate water rights to
meet forseeable needs and that continued acquisition of agricultural water
rights might have undesirable effects on the regional economy and on the
maintenance of attractive agricultural greenbelts around urban communities.5 8 In Utah, the scaling back of the IPP to one-half its planned size
cut into the speculative bubble that had risen around the project and prices
fell. The stabilization of water rights prices in Nevada's Truckee Meadows,
following price escalation in the early 1980s, may be a signal that panic
buying of water rights has slowed since private and government organizations agreed upon a system to facilitate an orderly transition of water
rights from agricultural to municipal use. In New Mexico's Gila-San
Francisco Basin, real prices have declined since Exxon and Boliden completed their acquisition program and since the closing of the Phelps Dodge
mining operation has been announced.
A relaxing of existing restrictions on market transfers could have important impacts on market prices. For instance, water rights in Denver
and its suburbs sell for twice the price of C-BT units and water development costs for proposed projects in the Denver area are up to six times
more per acre foot than the going price for C-BT water. If C-BT water
could be transferred outside of the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District, its price would undoubtedly rise.59
In summary, legal, economic, and hydrologic considerations all affect
water demand and supply and thus market price levels. Prices can fall
and rise rapidly as regional economic and institutional conditions change.
MARKET CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR VALUING WATER
Imperfect Competition and Market Restrictions
The market areas studied differ tremendously in numbers and kinds of
buyers and sellers, relative influences of various buyers and sellers, frequency of transactions, and degree of institutional restrictions on market
activities. For example, in both the Truckee River and the Lower Sevier
River Basins, utility companies are dominant market participants and may
58. ! Water Market Update 14 (Apr. 1987.)
59. Id.
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influence water rental and sales prices. One might hypothesize that dominant market actors function as price setters, sending price signals that
are followed by other market participants. The Intermountain Power Project has been an important market participant in the Lower Sevier Basin,
both as a purchaser of water rights and a renter of water to farmers, and
its large purchases in 1980 did temporarily influence price levels. Sierra
Pacific, the sole water buyer for many years in the Truckee Basin, failed
in its efforts to continue to buy water rights at low prices when new
buyers entered the market and bid up prices. Sierra Pacific's low offers
attracted few sellers and had little effect on market prices. Efforts by the
cities of Reno and Sparks to acquire abandoned irrigation rights in urban
areas at below market clearing prices have been equally unsuccessful.
The numbers of buyers and sellers and frequency of transactions affect
the quantity of price data available. A specific price may be a more reliable
measure of water value if there are a large number of transactions that
confirm that price. In regions with sporadic market activity and price
data, use of market prices should be supplemented by estimation of waters'
marginal value product in various uses or inferential techniques to determine recreation and other nonmarket values of water.
Imperfect competition may result not only from the activity of dominant
buyers and sellers, but also from public policy. Within any given market
area, different water rights are subject to different transfer restrictions.
For example, Type II rights in Arizona may be transferred separately
from the land to which they are appurtenant but must be sold as a whole
rather than piecemeal. Arizona irrigation rights, on the other hand, are
strictly appurtenant to land, but a farmer may sell a portion of (rather
than the entire quantity of) his irrigation rights so long as the appurtenant
land is also sold to the water rights buyer. Colorado transmountain diversion water can be transferred without considering the .impacts on downstream users of return flows, unlike native flow rights.' Transfers of
Lower Sevier River surface water rights can be implemented more readily
than transfers of groundwater rights in the Lower Sevier Basin."
The nature and degree of imperfect competition resulting from either
60. C. HOWE, D. SCHURMEIER & W. SHAW, INNOVATIONS IN WATER MANAGEMENT: AN Ex POST
ANALYSIS OF THE COLORADO-BIG

THOMPSON PROJECT AND THE NORTHERN COLORADO WATER

CONSERVANCY DISTiCT, unpublished manuscript (1982). See also supra note 34.

61. Groundwater rights in the Lower Sevier Basin generally are individually owned and are
appurtenant to specific parcels of land. Any proposed change in the point of diversion, place or
purpose of use of these rights requires proceedings before the State Engineer, who may decide to
limit or prohibit the transfer. In contrast, nearly all surface water rights on the Lower Sevier River
are controlled by the four DMAD mutual stock water companies, and the rights are appurtenant to
the companies' collective service areas. Water represented by stock in any one of the companies
may be transferred anywhere within the four company service area without requiring proceedings
before the State Engineer. Since the transfer of water to IPP in 1980, DMAD water may be used
either for irrigation or nonirrigation purposes.
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dominant buyers and sellers, or from public policies that restrict transfers,
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Prices generated in a competitive market with many buyers and sellers, none of whom can unilaterally influence price levels, are a better basis for estimating water values
than are prices generated in highly restricted markets dominated by a few
participants. However, since no market area included in this study approaches the competitive ideal, prices need to be interpreted with caution
and supplemented with nonmarket value information.
External Effects of Market Activities
Laws and institutions in each market area seek to minimize the impact
of water transfers on neighboring water users. Examples of rules that
seek to prevent externalities include well-spacing regulations and requirements for engineering studies to demonstrate absence of third-party effects
associated with proposed transfers. Such rules are designed to protect
other rights holders by focusing on return flow levels and groundwater
drawdown. They generally are not designed to prevent impairment to
instream uses of surface water, such as recreation, or to other water values
not protected by vested rights. External beneficial effects of market activity do occur. For example, transfer of C-BT units from irrigators to
cities (which have lower consumptive use and are upstream of irrigated
areas) has increased return flows for users downstream of cities. Another
example, irrigation water quality in the Lower Sevier River has improved
since IPP began to use its water rights. External effects of water transactions usually are not fully reflected in market prices. To the extent that
significant negative and positive effects of market activity exist, prices
will not accurately measure social values.
Uncertainty and Imperfect Information
All markets studied are characterized by varying degrees of uncertainty
and incomplete access to market information. The efficiency of a competitive market and the degree to which prices accurately represent values
rests on the assumption that either market participants can obtain accurate
information on prices and attributes of water commodities or that there
exist perfectly functioning contingency markets to allocate risks associated with imperfect information. These conditions are fulfilled for few,
if any, commodities and certainly do not hold for water markets. Legal,
hydrologic, and economic uncertainties affect market behavior, market
prices, and the degree to which prices may be useful indicators of value.
Unclarified legal issues create an environment in which market participants cannot be sure what they may and may not do. This uncertainty
may discourage expanded market activity. One example of the effect of
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uncertainty on willingness to pay for water involves the previously described purchase of Planet Ranch by the city of Scottsdale, Arizona.
Current estimates place the quantity available for transfer at about 13,500
acre feet per year. However, the precise quantity of water rights Scottsdale
acquired in its purchase and the proportion of those rights that may be
transported to Scottsdale raise complex legal issues that have not yet been
settled. In response to this uncertainty, Scottsdale included a clause in
the purchase contract specifying adjustments in the ultimate sales price
for the ranch should the water rights prove to be less than originally
estimated. The purchase agreement calls for a reduction in the total sales
price of $870 for each acre foot of water rights transferred less than the
planned 13,500 acre feet.6 2
The Arizona and Utah markets provide contrasting examples of access
to market information. The Arizona Department of Water Resources keeps
records of Type II water rights holders which may help buyers and sellers
to find one another, though there is no central clearing house for communicating bids and offers. Recorded transfers are few in number relative
to those recorded in Utah water markets. Arizona water markets are still
in the early stages of development so that potential buyers and sellers
have little experience and historical information on which to base expectations about water values and market processes. In Utah's Lower
Sevier Basin, irrigation company records provide information on ownership and rental patterns, and company offices have served as informal
clearinghouses helping prospective buyers, sellers, and renters to locate
one another. Historical records on the hydrologic cycle of the river system,
along with reservoir management planning and several decades of market
activity, give water users a basis for expectations about future water
availability and market trends.
Hydrologic uncertainty is inevitable in surface water markets since
flows may vary significantly from year to year. This uncertainty is mitigated to varying degrees by storage facilities and interbasin diversion
projects. One of the principal objectives of Colorado's C-BT Project is
to reduce uncertainty associated with erratic and seasonal natural streamflow. Uncertainty affects groundwater markets when there is incomplete
knowledge on aquifer capacity, rates of overdraft, energy prices and other
factors that affect the long-term expense of pumping groundwater. Hydrologic uncertainty affects how much individuals are willing to pay for
a water right. Senior surface water rights are generally more valuable
than junior surface water rights which are more vulnerable to seasonal
and year-to-year variations in flow. For example, for a brief period in
1981-1983, Sierra Pacific based their price offers for water rights on
62. Supra note 44.
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priority dates, with the most junior rights valued twenty-five percent less
than the most senior rights.6" Price data from the Gila-San Francisco
market in New Mexico indicates significantly higher prices are paid for
senior water rights (those with priority dates before 1930) than for junior
water rights.'
Economic uncertainty affects market prices because prices reflect expectations about future conditions. For instance, changing expectations
regarding future municipal growth and associated shifts in water demand
affect water prices near urban areas. The marginal value product of water
to irrigators rises and falls with crop prices, and water values for mining
and other industrial processes fluctuate with economic conditions affecting
those industries. With respect to valuing water, this implies that one needs
to identify social and economic factors that are influencing expectations
and observed prices. For instance, a short-run rise in prices due to expectations that a new industry may enter the area would not be a good
indicator of long-run water values until prices stabilize after expectations
either are or are not realized. However, a long-term dampening of prices
due to stagnation in a water-using sector of the economy (copper mining,
for instance) should be incorporated when evaluating supply augmentation
projects.
Equity and Conflict Resolution
In market areas where Native Americans hold a significant portion of
water rights, absence of tribal participation in water market transactions
implies that the values of a substantial water interest group will not be
reflected in market prices. In any region where potential beneficiaries of
supply augmentation projects are not market participants, estimation of
project impacts on these groups is necessary for a thorough assessment
of supply augmentation. Market prices provide no information on the
water values of individuals and groups who are not involved in market
processes.
Allocation of water to a specific area or group may serve as a tool for
conflict resolution. Both the Central Arizona and the Central Utah Projects
are viewed by some observers as strategies for resolving conflicts among
water user groups rather than as economically beneficial supply augmentation measures. Augmented supplies may be developed and allocated on
the basis of political rather than economic considerations. Decisionmakers
sometimes implement supply augmentation projects when water transfers
might be a lower cost alternative for providing water to expanding uses.
63. Supra note 19.
64, Bush and Saliba, Commodity Identification and Price Behavior in Western Water Markets,
Univ. of Ariz. (1986).
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In these situations it could be inferred that the conflict resolution and
other political values stemming from supply augmentation are perceived
to justify the project.
PracticalConsiderationsin Using Market Prices
Assume that there are no a priori reasons to suppose that market prices
are not appropriate measures of water value. What practical problems
would complicate use of market prices to value water? The diversity of
institutional settings in which market activities occur has practical implications for using prices as measures of value. First, there is no a priori
reason to believe that prices emerging in one market setting will be
relevant to water values in a different setting. Second, even within the
same market region, prices observed for one type of water rights do not
necessarily convey useful information about the value of a different type
of water right. This underscores the importance of identifying the institutional structures which will govern allocation, pricing, transfer and use
of new water supplies as a first step in valuing supply increases.
Another practical difficulty involves understanding the nature of the
various water "commodities" being transferred.65 Water rights in most
markets tend to be heterogenous. That is, the characteristics (such as
priority of use, quality of the water resource, flexibility in use and transfer)
which give them value as market commodities differ from one water right
to the next.
Even if water commodities are relatively homogenous, or if the heterogenous characteristic of different water commodities are well understood, there are other informational problems associated with using market
prices to value water. Obtaining data on water transfers and water market
prices can be difficult. Although most water transfers are documented by
state water agencies, water districts, or other water service organizations,
it may not be clear from the records which transfers involved a market
transfer of rights. Furthermore, few organizations record price data. Price
information can sometimes be obtained only by contacting buyers and
sellers. Prices may show significant variation from year to year, season
to season, and region to region. Some prices may reflect only the transfer
of water while others may include the transfer of real estate or other
property along with the water rights. It may be difficult to determine
which, if any, market prices (and at what points in time) are appropriate
measures of value.
Every market is influenced to some degree by one or more of the four
market characteristics summarized in Table 1. In addition, practical considerations affect collection and interpretations of price data. One of the
65. Supra note 64.
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implications of this research is that observed prices, even where they are
readily observable, cannot be used as measures of value until price formation processes and market characteristics are well understood. Observed prices typically deviate from a social value of water, suggesting
that market information be supplemented by other measures to assess
water values.
Other Indicators of Water Values
Techniques for estimating the marginal value product of water in agricultural production generally rely on programming methods due to the
absence of a wide range of observed water prices for agriculture. Kelso,
Martin, and Mack developed aggregate marginal demand curves for irrigation districts in Arizona to compare the value of water in agriculture
and related sectors of the economy.' Howitt, Wilson and Adams used a
quadratic programming model of field crop production to derive a demand
schedule for irrigation water in California's Central Valley.67 Gardner and
Miller compute the marginal value product of irrigation water in the CBT service area by a residual computation method, subtracting the costs
of all imputs except water from gross farm income."
A number of researchers have developed models of municipal water
demand. Howe and Linaweaver, in an early study using cross-sectional
data from twenty-one metropolitan areas, found that price elasticity of
demand differed substantially between indoor and outdoor use as well as
between eastern and western metropolitan areas.' Methods of estimating
urban demand functions continue to be refined. Martin's (and others)
critique the use of conventional regression analysis to estimate demand
in areas where water rates follow a block rate schedule and outline an
interactive regression procedure which produces unbiased estimates of
demand function co-efficients in a block rate setting. 7" Municipal demand
functions allow examination of the marginal value of water at differing
levels of supply and are thus an important valuation tool.
Methods for valuing water in recreational and other instream uses are
being developed and applied. Krutilla, Bowes and Sherman describe a
procedure to estimate the instream energy value of increased flow from
augmentation projects. 7 Martin and Cory comment on this study, em66. Supra note 5.
67. Howitt, Wilson & Adams, A Re-evaluation of Price Elasticitiesfor Irrigation Water, 16
WATER RESOURCES RES. 623-28 (1980).
68. Supra note 6.
69. Howe & Linnaweaver, The Impact of Price on Residential Water Demand and its Relation
to System Design and Price Structure, 3 WATER RESOURCES RES. 13-32 (1967).
70. W. MARTIN, H. INGRAM, N. LANEY & A. GRIFFIN, SAVING WATER IN A DESERT CITY 39-68
(1984).
7 1. Supra note 4.
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phasizing the importance of comparing water augmentation projects to
agricultural water transfer policies in terms of both net social benefits
and the incidence of benefits and costs on taxpayers, agriculture, and
municipal and industrial interests. 72 Daubert and Young apply contingent
valuation methods to instream flows and find that seasonal reallocation
of flows between irrigation and recreation could increase social benefits
associated with surface water use."
Lack of household, industry, and farm level data on water demand at
varying prices prevents the widespread use of empirically estimated water
demand functions to value water in alternative uses. Lack of widely
accepted methodologies and absence of data make estimation of instream
values difficult. In spite of the difficulties with estimating water's value
in alternative uses, market prices should be supplemented with nonmarket
approaches to valuing water whenever possible.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Western water transfers take place under diverse institutional, economic, and hydrologic conditions. Water markets are characterized by
various degrees of imperfect competition, third-party impacts, uncertainty, imperfect information, and distributional impacts. 74 These characteristics affect the appropriateness of market prices for use as measures
of value. Are prices set or constrained by government policies or dominant
market participants? If so, then market prices are not competitively determined. Do market transfers impose uncompensated costs or benefits
on third-parties? If so, then observed prices do not include all values
associated with the transfers. Is market activity dampened by hydrological, institutional and economic uncertainties? If so, then the level of
trading and market performance will reflect these uncertainties, and this
may distort prices as a measure of values.
While nearly all market prices deviate from an ideal measure of willingness to pay, observed prices may serve as a rough indicator of the
marginal value of additions to regional water supply if the additional
volume of water made available is small relative to the region's total
supply. For small supply increases, observed prices may approximate
current market participants' marginal willingness to pay for additonal
water supplied. However, market prices still will not reflect nonmarket
water use and third-party impacts of market activities. If the additional
72. Id.
73. Daubert & Young, Recreational Demands for Maintaining Instream Flows: A Contingent
Valuation Approach, 63 AM. J. AGMC. ECON. 666-76 (1981).
74. The 5 market areas described in this article, along with other market areas, are evaluated in
more detail in B. SALIBA & D. BusH, WATER MARKETS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: MARKET TRANSFERS,
WATER VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY (Westview Press 1987).
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volume of water is significant relative to existing supplies, estimates of
water's marginal value may be more difficult. The possibility that substantial increases in water supply could attract new water users into a
region and change the structure of demand for water must be considered.
For instance, rapid urban growth in southern Arizona is stimulated by
the perception that the Central Arizona Project ensures a reliable and
adequate regional water supply for expanding cities.
Institutional arrangements which govern allocation, use, and transfer
of water determine who bears the costs and who reaps the benefits of
water supply development. Information regarding how much new water
will be available to various user groups, how water will be priced, and
what restrictions will be placed on water use and transfer is essential to
the valuation process.
Estimating benefits of additional water availability using market prices
and nonmarket information on water values are only one step in evaluating
a supply augmentation proposal. The impacts of the proposed project
must be identified. Will the project affect the welfare of regional residents,
apart from the increased water supply? Impacts involving environmental
quality, employment, and recreational opportunities must be included in
evaluating the costs and benefits. Will the supply augmentation project
affect relative income and access to water among cities, farmers, industry,
Native Americans, or other major water interest groups? Projects which
aid in resolving water use conflicts may have social and political value
not typically reflected in economic evaluations. The overall merits of
water supply enhancement must be gauged by weighing direct and indirect
benefits against all costs associated with the project. As a final step in
the evaluation process, supply augmentation proposals should be compared with alternative water management strategies, such as increased
water conservation and transfer of existing supplies from lower-valued
uses to higher-valued uses. Such a comparison may indicate that supply
augmentation is not the most efficient means to accomplish regional water
management objectives.

